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NOTES
A Moment of Silence: A Permissible
Accommodation Protecting the Capacity
to Form Religious Belief
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court decisions prohibiting organized prayer'
and Bible reading2 in public schools have provoked considerable public debate
and have resulted in state legislatures enacting statutes providing for students'
observance of a "moment of silence" at the beginning of the school day.'
Commentators who have considered the constitutionality of state moment
of silence statutes have not reached uniform conclusions. 4 Lower courts have
struck down several of these statutes under constitutional challenge as being
an establishment of religion in violation of the first amendment.5 The
1. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
3. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1985); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-522 (Supp. 1984);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1607.1 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-16a (West 1985);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4101 (1981) (as interpreted in Op. Att'y Gen. 79-I 011 (1979)); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 233.062 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 122, § 771 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-7-11 (Burns 1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 72.5308a (1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:2115 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20-A, § 4805 (1983); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-104 (1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71,
§ IA (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); MICH. Compn. LAws ANN. § 380.1565 (West Supp. 1985);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 18A:36-4 (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.1 (1981); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 3029-a (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-30.1 (1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.60.1 (Page 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15.1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 16-12-3.1 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1004 (1983); VA. CODE § 22.1-203 (1985);
see also Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 407-08 (1983) (comparing the provisions contained in these statutes).
4. Commentators favoring a moment of silence include L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 829 (1978); Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329, 371 (1963); Freund, The Legal Issue, in RELIION
AND THE PUBLIc SCHOOLs 23 (1965); Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court,
61 MIcH. L. REv. 1031, 1041 (1963); Comment, Accommodating Religion in the Public Schools,
59 NEB. L. REv. 425, 450-54 (1980); Note, Religion and the Public Schools, 20 VAND. L. REv.
1078, 1092-93 (1967). Commentators finding fault with a moment of silence include Drakeman,
Prayer in the Schools: Is New Jersey's Moment of Silence Law Constitutional?, 35 RUTGERS
L. RE v. 341 (1983); Note, The Unconstitutionality of State Statutes Authorizing Moments of
Silence in the Public Schools, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1874 (1983); Note, supra note 3.
5. See May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985); Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub.
Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn.
1982), appeal dismissed, vacated, remanded sub nom. Beck v. Alexander, 718 F.2d 1098 (1983);
Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 387 Mass. 1201, 440 N.E.2d 1159
(1982). But see Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976) (upholding constitu-
tionality of moment of silence statute as an accommodation of religion).
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Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Alabama moment of
silence statute6 in Wallace v. Jaffree7 and, in a deeply divided decision, found
the statute to be unconstitutional as a "law respecting the establishment of
religion within the meaning of the First Amendment." 8 The Court's decision
does not, however, render other states' moment of silence statutes consti-
tutionally infirm. 9
This Note will explore the role that religion should play in public school
curricula under a principle of permissive government accommodation of
religion. This accommodation principle is a resolution of the inherent tension
between the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment. 0
To reflect this accommodation principle the Court's current three-part test"
for establishment clause cases, which the majority relied upon in Jaffree,
will be replaced with an accommodation analysis which balances competing
free exercise and establishment clause interests in the public school environ-
ment.' 2 Under the accommodation analysis, state statutes permitting a mo-
ment of silence constitute a constitutionally permissive accommodation of
religion based upon their inherent free exercise gains in the secular public
school environment.
Section I of this Note will consider the inherent hostility toward traditional
theistic religions that results from maintaining a "wall of separation" between
church and state. Analysis of the Jaffree decision reveals that the majority
opinion perpetuates this hostility by failing to utilize an accommodation
analysis. Section II will examine the failure of other Supreme Court decisions
to articulate and consistently apply an accommodation principle. Section III
will detail free exercise and establishment clause values and develop an
accommodation analysis. Section IV will apply this accommodation analysis
to a statute permitting or requiring a moment of silence. Because the free
exercise gain derived from a moment of silence exercise exceeds any religious
establishment dangers, this Note concludes that the exercise is a permissible
state accommodation of religion.
6. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1985).
7. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
8. Id. at 2482.
9. The Jaffree majority stated that "[t]he legislative intent to return prayer to the public
schools is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in
voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day." Id. at 2491.
Similarly, Justice O'Connor concurred, stating, "I write separately ... to explain why moment
of silence laws in other States do not necessarily manifest the same infirmity." Id. at 2496
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. In order to be held constitutional under the establishment clause a statute must, first,
have a secular legislative purpose, second, have a primary effect which neither advances nor
inhibits religion and, third, not foster excessive government entanglement with religious insti-
tutions. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as the Lemon
test).
12. See infra notes 142-67 and accompanying text.
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I. THE DILEMMA OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Separation of Church and State
The religion clauses of the first amendment require that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .... ',' All of the first amendment rights (including the
religion clauses) are a reflection of the political beliefs of the Framers of
the Constitution. In principle, their objective was to ensure that individuals
be treated as the central unit of political and social life, free to worship,
develop and express themselves as they see fit.' 4
A tension exists between the two clauses which arises from the requirements
that legislation not tend to establish or impermissibly aid religion, yet not
inhibit religious practice and belief. ,5 The twin concerns of the religion clauses
often leave the Supreme Court with discretion to choose between competing
values.' 6 In no area are these competing values more at odds than in the
area of religious involvement in public education.'7
Regarding the accommodation of religious practice and belief in public
school curricula, the Supreme Court has held that a wall of separation is
to be maintained between church and state' s and that the use of the state's
compulsory public school program to. disseminate religious doctrines breaches
this wall.' 9 In this regard, Justice Frankfurter stated that "[the] public school
is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for
promoting our common destiny." As such, it is the "Court's duty to enforce
this principle [wall of separation] in its full integrity." 20
Exclusion of religious belief and values from public education is consti-
tutionally problematical, despite Supreme Court decisions to the contrary.
Public education, by nature of its function, occupies a large portion of a
child's life and is responsible for much of the child's ethical and moral
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) first held the free
exercise clause applicable to the states. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) first held
the establishment clause applicable to the states.
14. See Arons & Lawrence, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Cri-
tique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309, 311-12 (1980) (citations omitted).
15. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-6, at 815.
16. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text. The free speech or equal protection issues
that may also arise in the context of accommodating religion in the public schools reach beyond
the scope of this Note.
17. Americans are concerned that our public schools be kept free of sectarianism while at
the same time not be dominated by secularism. 2 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 497 (1950).
18. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
19. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
20. Id. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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development. 2' Critical education must address questions concerning the
"meaning of existence and the sources and nature of human values." 22 One
commentator has suggested that public schools should be value-free or neu-
tral, but "elements of human experience are value-free only if they are
totally devoid of meaning. ' 23 The Court has, itself, repeatedly recognized
the role of public education in conveying values to its students. 24
The absence of all forms of theistic religion from public schools is con-
stitutionally problematical for at least three reasons. First, the exclusion of
religion from educational curricula is itself a negative form of religious
training. Exclusion of religious values and beliefs implies that religion is
unimportant for an intellectual and moral foundation. 2 One commentator
has observed that "[if] the schools are regarded as helping to shape the
child's total world, then the exclusion of religion cannot help but shape a
religionless world. At the most formative period of their lives, children are
in effect taught that religion is unimportant or even perhaps false." 26
This hostility toward religion arising from its exclusion from public schools
is but one particularly acute example of such hostility throughout our society.
Initially, the Framers' principle prohibiting an establishment of religion
coincided with and applied to a federal government of limited powers. This
principle has subsequently been applied to the states-through the fourteenth
amendment. 27 With the expansion of state and federal government regulation
and contact with individuals came an increase in the government sphere of
influence at the expense of religious influence. 28 This increase in influence
of government secularism is constitutionally suspect as it not only tends to
disestablish religion but also burdens the free exercise thereof.29
21. See, e.g., Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development,
Part II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 561 (1968); Katz, Freedom
of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 426, 438 (1953).
22. Giannella, supra note 21, at 561.
23. R. MCMILLAN, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 116 (1984).
24. In Brown v. Board of Educ. the Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.... [I]t is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment.
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (citations omitted); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76
(1979) ("preservation of the values on which our society rests"); Arons & Lawrence, supra
note 14; Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REv.
127, 161 (1985).
25. J. BENNETT, CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE 236-37 (1958).
26. Hitchcock, Church, State and Moral Values: The Limits of American Pluralism, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 3, 13.
27. See supra note 13.
28. Giannella, supra note 21, at 513-14.
29. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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Second, exclusion of religion is problematical because it creates an ideo-
logical void at the time when children are developing their moral and ethical
beliefs.30 The curricula's emphasis upon objectivity and empiricism for the
development of knowledge undermines the subjective approaches to knowl-
edge.3 In the absence of religious ideology, the beliefs of the instructor 2 or
the creation of a secular ideology may be imposed to facilitate moral and
philosophical growth.33
Third, the absence of all religious training and exposure creates an edu-
cational and cultural void in public school education. The Supreme Court
has made reference in dicta to programs containing objective secular instruc-
tion of religion and has in principle approved such programs. 34
Because the exclusion of religion may carry not only an implied message
of the inferiority of religious belief and practice but may also create a void
in educational curricula, public schools create a hostile environment for
children to maintain and exercise their religious values. Furthermore, the
exclusion of religion also creates the opportunity for the instructor or school
administration to present alternative ideology which may contradict religious
values or beliefs without providing for the corresponding examination of
those religious values or beliefs. Religious beliefs initiated and cultivated
wholly outside the public school curricula can subsequently be impaired as
students' capacities to form religious belief are reduced. The impairment of
children's capacities to form religious belief serves to burden the free exercise
of religion no less than the denial of religious liberty for an adult.
30. R. MCMILLAN, supra note 23, at 107.
31. The secularization of public schools has resulted in a shift in emphasis from "values
to knowledge and techniques." J. BOWER, MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN EDUCATION 9
(1952).
32. R. MCMILLAN, supra note 23, at 110-11. See also Note, supra note 24, at 164 (Any
attempt to remove "value inculcation" from public schools "would effectively eliminate all the
'why' questions from the public school curriculum, as well as all investigations of normative
hypotheses. It is doubtful that teachers could avoid answering such questions; if they did the
classroom would become a sterile atmosphere where the development of children into mature,
thinking, responsible individuals would be minimal at best.").
33. Humanistic Education is a secular response to the exclusion of religious values from
public education and is an attempt to restore a proper balance between objective scientific
methodology and subjective value belief. Comment, Humanistic Values in the Public School
Curriculum: Problems in Defining an Appropriate "Wall of Separation," 61 Nw. U.L. REv.
795, 804 (1966). For a useful discussion of the goals and methods of Humanistic Education
see Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral Child: Legal Implications of Values Education, 6
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 105 (1978); Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects,
and Humanistic Education, 91 YALE L.J. 1196 (1982).
34. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (Clark, J.); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). The consideration of
the constitutional and practical difficulties in implementing such an objective program is beyond
the scope of this Note. For a useful discussion of the complexities of objective religious education
see R. MCMILLAN, supra note 23.
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B. Wallace v. Jaffree: A Court Unable to Resolve the Dilemma
The Supreme Court's decision in Wallace v. Jaffreels is more noteworthy
for the dissension within the Court as to the proper analysis to be employed
in establishment clause cases than for the narrow factual determination upon
which the majority decision was founded. 6 Although the majority applied
the Lemon test,37 its interpretation was "reexamined and refined" in con-
curring opinions. Justices White and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger,
in dissent, did not feel constrained to rely on the Lemon test in evaluating
the Alabama statute.3 9
The plaintiff, Ishmael Jaffree, brought suit in federal district court on
behalf of his three minor children challenging the constitutionality of three
Alabama statutes. 40 The district court upheld Alabama Code § 16-1-20, '
enacted in 1978, which provided for a moment of silence.42 Jaffree did not
appeal that determination. The district court also upheld the constitutionality
of Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1,' 4 enacted in 1981 and providing for "medi-
tation or voluntary prayer," and Alabama Code § 16-1-20.2,- enacted in
1982 and providing for audible prayer composed by the state, notwithstand-
ing the district court's finding that these statutes were an effort on the behalf
35. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
36. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
37. 105 S. Ct. at 2489.
38. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2493 (Powell, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 2507 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting); id. at
2518 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 2481-82.
41. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1985) provides:
At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the sixth
grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such
class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in
duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any such period silence
shall be maintained and no activities engaged in.
42. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
43. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1985) provides:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public
schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held may announce
that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed
for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities
shall be engaged in.
44. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1985) provides:
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution
within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning
of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing students in prayer,
or may lead the willing students in the following prayer to God:
Almighty God, you alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Creator
and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, and Your peace
abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our govern-
ment, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the
name of our Lord. Amen.
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of Alabama to encourage religion, because the district court concluded that
Alabama retained the power to establish a religion .4 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals concurred with the district court finding of religious
purpose but held both statutes unconstitutional. 46 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the unconstitutionality of § 16-1-20.247 and in 1985 was presented
with the sole issue of whether the Alabama statute authorizing a moment
of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" was a "law respecting the
establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. '48
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, characterized the case as one in-
volving establishment clause concerns and applied the Lemon test require-
ments that a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, a primary effect
which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and that it not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion.4 9 Upon finding that Alabama's actual
purpose was to advance religion, the Court found it unnecessary to consider
the effect of, or possible entanglement caused by, the statute.50 Justice Stevens
affirmed the court of appeals' finding of religious purpose based upon the
addition of the words "or voluntary prayer" to the 1978 statute providing
for silent meditation and certain statements contained in the legislative history
as manifesting government endorsement and promotion of prayer.5
Justice Powell concurred in the Court's opinion and judgment and, in
responding to criticism of the Lemon test, sought to further explain the
purpose requirement.' 2 Under the purpose requirement, a statute is not
required to have "exclusively secular objectives" but the secular legislative
purpose must be sincere." In the present case, however, Alabama's purpose
in enacting the second moment of silence statute was found to be solely
religious in nature . 4 If Alabama had been able to present a secular purpose
behind its statute, Justice Powell would have voted to uphold it. 5
Justice O'Connor, concurring only in judgment, renewed her proposed
refinement of the purpose and effect requirements of the Lemon test 56 which
she first introduced in Lynch v. Donnelly." This refinement is based upon
45. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
46. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1983).
47. Wallace v. Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984).
48. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2482.
49. Id. at 2489-93.
50. Id. at 2490.
51. Id. at 2490-92. Chief Justice Burger vigorously criticized the majority's use of individual
state senators' statements inserted into the Senate Journal after passage of the legislation as
indicative of legislative intent. Id. at 2506 (Burger, C.J.). Justice O'Connor concurred on this
point. Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J.).
52. Id. at 2493-96 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 2494.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2495.
56. See id. at 2496, 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the perception that the religious liberty protected by the establishment clause
is "infringed when the government makes adherence to religion relevant to
a person's standing in the political community."58 The Lemon inquiry into
the purpose and effect of a statute requires an examination of whether the
purpose is to endorse religion and whether the effect is the conveyance of
a message of government endorsement.5 9 This endorsement test would permit
government to acknowledge and consider religion when acting so long as
government endorsement is avoided.60 Applying this standard to the Alabama
statute, Justice O'Connor concluded that the law "does more than permit
prayer to occur during a moment of silence 'without interference' [rather]
[i]t endorses the decision to pray during a moment of silence, and accordingly
sponsors a religious exercise. ''61
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, in dissent, did not feel compelled
to apply the Lemon test as a standard of establishment clause values. 62
Justice Rehnquist, after a detailed consideration of the historical development
of the religion clauses63 concluded that the Lemon test lacked a "grounding
in the history of the First Amendment" and represented a "determined
effort to craft a workable rule from an historically faulty doctrine." 64
Every opinion in the Jaffree decision recognizes that a state statute pro-
viding for a moment of silence may, under some circumstances, be consti-
tutional.65 Due to the absence of a satisfactory analytical framework, however,
58. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J.).
Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is
invalid under this approach because it "sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accom-
panying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community."
Id. (quoting Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2502.
62. "The Court's extended treatment of the [Lemon test] . . . suggests a naive preoccuption
with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional issues." Id. at 2507 (Burger,
C.J.). "[I] would support a basic reconsideration of our precedents." Id. at 2508 (White, J.).
63. Id. at 2508-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2518.
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of
any church as a "national" one. The Clause was also designed to stop the Federal
Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect
over others. Given the "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause as against
the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as
well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects. As its history
abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires gov-
ernment to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause
prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through
nondiscriminatory sectarian means.
Id. at 2520.
65. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens recognized that "[t]he legislative intent to return
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determining which statutory language or legislative history might provide
for a constitutional, state-mandated moment of silence is not easily accom-
plished. The accommodation principle, with its foundation in prior Court
decisions, 6 can provide a framework consistent with both the free exercise
and establishment clauses.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
THE ACCOMMODATION PRINCIPLE
The accommodation principle arises out of the recognition that charac-
terizing a statute67 as raising establishment clause concerns can ignore com-
peting free exercise values. Failing to consider the underlying principles of
both clauses can exacerbate the tension between the two. The accommodation
principle aims to maximize the objectives of both clauses by subtly applying
the objectives of each to the challenged legislation. Under this constitutional
standard exists an area of permissible accommodation within which a leg-
islature remains empowered to facilitate the free exercise of religion through
legislation. The Court's current -methodology of characterizing a case as falling
primarily under one clause fails to recognize permissible accommodation in
many circumstances.
In order to define the parameters of permissive government accommo-
dation, it will be necessary to consider Supreme Court decisions over the
past thirty years. First, cases characterized as "free exercise cases" are
discussed. Under the free exercise clause, the Court has required government
accommodation of religion based on a perceived burden upon free exercise.
Second, "establishment clause cases" are considered to illustrate that the
Court has permitted permissive government accommodation of religion in
public schools despite the principle that a wall of separation be maintained
between church and state. Third, the Court's present establishment clause
test will be explored and criticized for failing to consider free exercise
principles.
Analysis of these cases will show that the Court has required government
accommodation to protect the capacity to form religious belief. Furthermore, the
Court has been unable to settle upon establishment clause analysis which
properly reflects accommodation principles.
prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's
right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school
day." Id. at 2491. See also id. at 2493 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2496 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
66. See infra notes 67-116 and accompanying text.
67. Although this Note will refer to legislation, the accommodation principle will apply to
all government action.
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A. Free Exercise and the Accommodation Requirement
The free exercise clause "prohibits the proscription of any religious belief
by the government. ' 68 The Supreme Court has defined this clause so as to
obligate government to accommodate religious beliefs and practices.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,69 Wisconsin had enacted a statute which required
school attendance until the age of sixteen. Amish parents were convicted of
violating this statute for removing their children from school after the eighth
grade70 and implementing an informal system of vocational training. 7' The
Court found that the statute violated the Amish parents' right to free exercise
as protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. 72
In granting the Amish parents this exemption the Court relied in great
part upon the evidence tending to show that compulsory education after the
eighth grade would impede Amish religious and vocational development and
threaten the "continued survival of Amish communities. ' 73 The Court dis-
missed the state's claim that free exercise protection extended only to religious
belief and held the first amendment extended its protection to religious
practice.74
The nature of the free exercise burden recognized in Yoder is important
because the Court granted free exercise protection against impediments to
the formation of religious belief. The Court characterized the burden on
free exercise by stating that "compulsory school attendance to age 16 for
Amish children carries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as they exist today."' 75 Attendance at sec-
ondary school threatened the existence of Amish communities by obstructing
the formation of Amish beliefs and values in their children. The Court in
Yoder impliedly recognized that a burden upon the formation of religious
belief can require government accommodation of religion in its school system
to relieve the free exercise impediment.
This extension of free exercise protection to include the formation of
theistic belief is central to the accommodation principle in the public school
curricula. Absence of theistic religion from the public school curricula and
the possible substitution of contrary secular ideology creates an environment
68. J. NOWAK, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 871 (1978).
69. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
70. Id. at 207.
71. Id. at 212.
72. Id. at 234.
73. Id. at 209.
74. Id. at 219-20. But, religious conduct can be subject to regulation under state police
power. Id.
75. Id. at 218. "[S]econdary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences
in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with
the religious development of the Amish child . . . at the crucial adolescent stage of development,
contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith. ... Id.
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which is hostile toward the formation of theistic belief. Government accom-
modation of theistic belief under such circumstances can be seen as per-
missive, if not required, in order to protect free exercise goals.
In Sherbert v. Verner 6 a Seventh-day Adventist was discharged from her
employment and was, thereafter, unable to obtain comparable employment
because she was unwilling to work on Saturday, her Sabbath.77 Her claim
for unemployment compensation was denied as she was found to have failed,
without good cause, to accept "suitable work when offered" 7 under the
South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act.79 The Court held that
South Carolina could not constitutionally apply its Act so as to "constrain
a worker to abandon [her] religious convictions respecting the day of rest" 80
and ordered the state to grant an exemption.
Sherbert was explicitly affirmed in Thomas v. Review Board, 8 a case with
strikingly similar circumstances. In Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness refused an
employment transfer and quit on the grounds that his religious beliefs forbid
the manufacture of weapons.82 His claim for unemployment compensation
was similarly denied for termination without good cause. 3 Justice Burger
found the coercive effect of having to choose between "fidelity to religious
belief or cessation of work" to be indistinguishable from Sherbert.8 4
In Sherbert and Thomas, as in Yoder, the Court recognized that the free
exercise clause can compel government accommodation of religion. In Yoder,
the free exercise claim was based upon evidence that the state's mandatory
education requirement threatened the continued existence of the Amish re-
ligion.' The Court characterized this burden as "the kind of objective danger
to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to
prevent. ' ' 86 In Sherbert and Thomas, however, the free exercise claim was
much less compelling. Those states' unemployment compensation require-
ments did not affirmatively impede religious practice, belief, or the formation
of belief, nor did their requirements threaten a religious community's con-
tinued existence.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Thomas, argued that the state's refusal
to grant unemployment compensation imposed only an indirect burden on
the exercise of religion.87 The state did not discriminate against religion, and
76. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
77. Id. at 399.
78. Id. at 401.
79. Id. at 400-01.
80. Id. at 410.
81. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
82. Id. at 710.
83. Id. at 712.
84. Id. at 717.
85. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
86. 406 U.S. at 218.
87. 450 U.S. at 722-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19861
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
all applicants who quit for personal reasons would be denied unemployment
compensation.88 In these circumstances religious practice and belief were not
made unlawful, just more expensive. 89
The Court's dispute over the characterization of Thomas as a free exercise
case underscores the fact that characterization often determines the resolution
of the case without inquiring into competing values. Under the accommo-
dation principle, the question of whether a free exercise burden is significant
enough to be characterized as a free exercise case is eliminated. Rather, the
degree of free exercise gain and loss created by government action will be
a relevant consideration.
To further illustrate the difficulties inherent in the Court's characterization
of Sherbert and Thomas as free exercise cases, it can be noted that both
cases raise establishment clause issues. Because of the free exercise charac-
terization, the Court gave rather minimal attention to establishment clause in-
fringement resulting from impermissible aid to religion.9 Justice Stewart,
concurring in Sherbert, observed that the Court's insensitive approach to
establishment clause consideration was contrary to traditional doctrine for-
bidding government support and assistance to religion.9' Similarly, Justice
Rehnquist argued in Thomas that if a state were to legislate an exemption
for persons who quit their employment for religious reasons, as the Court
ordered, this would violate the establishment clause.92
In these cases which the Court has characterized as free exercise, the Court
has recognized that the first amendment may require government accom-
modation of religious practice, belief and formation of belief-even in the
case of compulsory education. The Court has mandated accommodation
despite a relatively small burden on free exercise and the existence of a
potentially impermissible establishment. As it is the scope of this Note to
explore the parameters of permissible accommodation, the inquiry must turn
toward "establishment clause cases" and the existence of permissible ac-
commodation in that context.93 Analysis will show that characterization of
88. Id. at 723.
89. Id. at 722 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)) (Sunday closing laws do
not violate the first amendment rights of Sabbatarians). This Note does not adopt the view of
Justice Rehnquist that the free exercise clause should rarely be used to require special treatment
for religion. His characterization of the case as not being a free exercise case is useful for
illustrating the arbitrariness of characterizing many cases as being exclusively free exercise or
establishment clause. The accommodation principle recognizes this fallacy and instead proposes
to balance the free exercise and establishment clause gains and losses created by government
action.
90. "[T]he extension of unemployment benefits . .. does not represent that involvement
of religions with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to
forestall." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409. See also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719-20.
91. 374 U.S. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., concurring).
92. 450 U.S. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. See infra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
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a case as establishment clause is similarly problematical as it fails to consider
free exercise claims.
B. Establishment Clause and Permissive Accommodation
Since 1947, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the establishment clause
has caused great controversy. In Everson v. Board of Education,94 the Court
upheld a New Jersey statute permitting school districts to reimburse parents
for the transportation costs incurred by their children in attending parochial
schools. Justice Black, writing for the majority, considered the political
events leading to the adoption of the first amendment and the writings of
Madison and Jefferson and concluded that "[t]he First Amendment has
erected a wall [of separation] between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach." 95
The Court, nevertheless, approved the program to avoid hindering the free
exercise right to attend parochial school. The establishment clause did not
"prohibit New Jersey from extending its General State law benefits to all
its citizens without regard to their religious belief. ' 96
Justice Rutledge, joined in dissent by three Justices, accepted the wall of
separation metaphor but construed it to require a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious and government activity. 97 The very
fact that the Court was able to agree on the governing principle and yet
divided five to four brings to question the utility of this principle" and the
appropriateness of characterizing this case as falling under the establishment
clause. Implicit in the Everson decision is the recognition that free exercise
would have been burdened by prohibition of this government accommoda-
tion. In addition, the wall of separation between church and state contains
room for legislative accommodation of religion.
The following year the Court confronted a legislative attempt to accom-
modate religious instruction in the public schools. In McCollum v. Board
of Education," the Board of Education in Champaign County, Illinois had
adopted a religious instruction release-time program in the public schools.
Classes were held in public school and instructed by persons selected by an
interdenominational council. Those students not attending religious instruc-
tion were sent to another area of the school but not released from school.' °°
94. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
95. Id. at 18.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
98. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-4, at 820. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.
Ct. 1355, 1359 (1984) (dismissing the wall of separation as "not a wholly accurate description
of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state").
99. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
100. Id. at 205-07.
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The Court found the in-school release-time program to be an unconstitutional
establishment because: (1) tax-supported public school buildings were being
used for the dissemination of religious doctrine and, (2) the government was
granting religious groups an impermissible aid by the use of the compulsory
public school system.' 0'
Four years later, the Court, in Zorach v. Clauson,'0 2 considered the con-
stitutionality of an out-of-school release-time program for religious instruc-
tion in the public schools. By written request, a student would be released
from public school for religious instruction or service, but those not attending
would remain in public school. 03 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas
distinguished McCollum in that the program in question did not involve
religious indoctrination in the public classroom nor the expenditure of public
funds.104 In the present case, he wrote, the "public schools do no more than
accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious instruc--
tion."10
Justice Douglas made reference to the relationship that should exist be-
tween church and state in stating that "[we] sponsor an attitude on the part
of government that shows no partiality to any one group and lets each
flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.""106
He further considered the hostility toward religion inherent in a separation
of church and state and concluded that callous indifference toward religious
groups is not required by the Constitution.'0 7
The propriety of the Court's distinction between Zorach and McCollum
as based upon the out-of-school program's absence of coercive effect and
nonuse of public school classrooms'08 was subject to vigorous criticism in
dissent and commentary. Regarding Justice Douglas' finding of an absence
of coercive effect, Justice Jackson responded that the effectiveness of release-
time over voluntary instruction hinges on the coercive nature of the program:
"Public school serves as a temporary jail for a pupil who will not go to
Church."°"9
The distinction between in-school and out-of-school release-time programs
also seems to lack constitutional significance. One commentator has suggested
two bases for the insignificance of the use of public property to accommodate
religion." 0 First, in Engel v. Vitale"' greater use of public property was
101. Id. at 212.
102. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
103. Id. at 308.
104. Id. at 308-09.
105. Id. at 315.
106. Id. at 313.
107. Id. at 313-14.
108. Id. at 311.
109. Id. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
110. Choper, supra note 4, at 351-53.
III. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding unconstitutional state composed audible prayer).
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made as teachers led students in audible prayer, yet McCollum was not cited
as requiring nonuse of public schools. Second, the equal protection clause
may forbid discriminatory practice in denying religious organizations access
to public property.' 2
Distinguishing the two cases on the observation that McCollum's prohi-
bition of in-school release-time was necessary to ensure equality of treatment
for all religions is more appealing." 3 As Justice Frankfurter observed, "not
even all the practicing sects ... are willing or able to provide religious
instruction."" 4 This requirement that government activity be neutral as be-
tween religious sects has been vigorously upheld in a recent decision"5 and
becomes an important consideration under accommodation analysis." 6
C. Dissatisfaction with the Lemon Test
The absence of utility in the wall of separation metaphor is due in large
part to its failure to articulate guidelines under which accommodation of
religious practice and belief can be accomplished. As a result of the early
establishment clause analysis, the Court has developed a three-part inquiry
for analysis in establishment clause cases. The Lemon"17 test, which the
majority applied in Wallace v. Jaffree,"s requires that in order to survive
establishment clause challenge a statute must, first, "have a secular legislative
purpose," second, have a primary effect which "neither advances nor inhibits
religion" and, third, "not foster excessive government entanglement" with
religious institutions.' '9 Legislation which violates any of these three tests
must be struck down as violative of the establishment clause. 20
The secular purpose requirement reflects the belief that religious freedom
necessitates that government action "be justifiable in secular terms." '' 2' To
find legislative purpose a court may consider statements of legislative purpose
contained in the statute,' 22 purpose implied from the statute 23 or legislative
112. See supra note 16.
113. Choper, supra note 4, at 353-54.
114. 333 U.S. at 227 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
115. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); see infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text
for brief discussion of decision.
116. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
117. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
118. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2489-93 (1985).
119. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
120. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam).
121. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-8, at 835. If accommodation of religion is permissible
under certain circumstances, governmental purpose to accommodate becomes constitutionally
permissible as well. It is inconsistent that the Constitution seeks to protect the right to freely
exercise religion and yet government actions taken for the purpose of advancing free exercise
rights are unconstitutional under the establishment clause. See Johnson, Concepts and Com-
promise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 827 (1984).
122. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-42 (1973).
123. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
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history.' 24 Courts have invalidated legislation for lack of secular purpose but
only when there "was no question" that the statute was "motivated wholly
by religious considerations." ' 25
The requirement that a statute not have the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion invalidates legislation which aids all religions or prefers
one religion over another.' 26 The Court has disregarded the task of distin-
guishing between primary and secondary effects of promoting religion .1 2
Rather, the Court has required that the challenged religious effect be remote,
indirect and incidental. 128
The no excessive entanglement requirement arises out of the desire to
avoid government interference with religious institutions. 29 This prong of
the Lemon inquiry recognizes that excessive entanglement may infringe upon
the freedom of religious institutions, grant these institutions inordinate po-
litical power or create political divisiveness within the population based upon
religious lines. 30
The Lemon test, like its predecessor the "wall of separation" metaphor,
does not give explicit recognition to the notion that complete separation of
church and state is not required, nor is it sensitive toward free exercise
values arising in establishment clause contexts. Nonetheless, the Court has
used the Lemon test in cases concerning aid to religious schools and has
upheld statutes permitting tax deductions for tuition, ,a' and providing trans-
portation,'3 2 secular school books,' 3  and diagnostic services. 3 4
The Court has justified government aid to religious schools by character-
izing the aid as public welfare legislation. 35 One commentator has argued
that the secular and religious functions of religious schools cannot be sep-
arated because the objective of those schools is to create a religious atmos-
phere and perspective throughout the curriculum. 3 6 As a result, aid to
religious institutions may serve as a more direct establishment of religion
than accommodation of theistic belief in the wholly secular public schools.
The cases concerning government aid to religious schools are useful, not
for criticizing their holdings (they may have been properly decided under
124. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363-68 (1975).
125. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984) (citations omitted).
126. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
127. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n.39 (1973).
128. Id.
129. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-12, at 865.
130. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1367 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
132. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (used only effect prong of Lemon test).
133. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1977).
134. Id. at 244.
135. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-19.
136. See Giannella, supra note 21, at 514. "Indeed the view is sincerely avowed by many
of various faiths that the basic purpose of all education is or should be religious, that the
secular cannot be and should not be separated from the religious phase and emphasis." Everson,
330 U.S. at 46 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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accommodation analysis) but rather for recognizing that the Lemon test is
ill-suited to address accommodation values. Because the test fails to consider
free exercise values, it provides no basis for delineating zones of permissible
accommodation. This inadequacy of the Lemon test can be witnessed in the
Court's recent decisions straining 37 and even disregarding 38 the test in order
to permit government accommodation of religion.
Against this historical backdrop, the absence of a consensus in analysis
in the Jaffree decision can be seen as the result of the majority's failure to
consider free exercise values.' 39 The majority recognized that moment of
silence statutes may, under some circumstances, be constitutional,140 yet under
the Lemon test there is no clear basis for that result. Rather than concluding
that, at some indeterminable level, the advancement of religion is acceptable,
the Court should approve moment of silence legislation when its free exercise
gains outweigh any establishment clause concerns. Justice O'Connor's re-
finement of the Lemon test to inquire into the level of state endorsement
of religion' 4' suffers from the same infirmity as the original Lemon test, as
it fails to consider free exercise values in determining the level at which
endorsement of religion becomes acceptable.
III. ACCOMMODATION ANALYSIS
This section will briefly sketch the free exercise and establishment clause
considerations relevant to an accommodation of religion in the public school
context. Although declining to provide a hard-and-fast rule in this area,
accommodation analysis seeks to reduce the tension between the clauses by
balancing their respective interests to maximize both. Accommodation anal-
ysis serves to avoid the characterization fiction that the Supreme Court has
used in past cases.' 42 Future cases can be viewed as religion clause cases in
which free exercise and establishment clause values are both pertinent.
A. Free Exercise Considerations
1. Benefits to Free Exercise
The rationale for inquiring into the free exercise benefits that a statute
may provide arises out of the importance of the free exercise clause under
137. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3064 (1983); see also Note, Mueller v. Allen: A
New Standard of Scrutiny Applied to Tax Deductions for Educational Expenses, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 983.
138. The Court has "repeatedly emphasized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any single
test or criterion in this sensitive area." Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984); see
also Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
139. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
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the first amendment. As Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in Zorach,
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for
as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of men deem
necessary."
43
A value judgment is made in the situation in which free exercise and
establishment clause values come into conflict.,44 Commentators have argued
that the free exercise clause should take preference. Free exercise, as a civil
right, should be preferred over the establishment clause and its basis in
eighteenth-century political theory which is no longer consistent with today's
large regulatory government. 45 By permitting consideration of free exercise
values in cases in which the existing burden on free exercise is not sufficient
to be classified as a free exercise case, accommodation analysis requires a
balancing between the clauses that must be more subtle than mere preference
for free exercise. This balancing will ultimately become a value judgment,
but such a delineation is necessary upon recognition that the first amendment
neither requires nor permits complete separation of church and state.
In order to respect students' free exercise rights, public schools must design
their curricula to protect students' capacities to form theistic belief.4 6 To
the degree that a secular curriculum impairs formation of theistic belief, it also
burdens the free exercise of religion. The success of implementing accom-
modation programs, like the moment of silence, will depend in great part
upon the success of educators and sociologists in further recognizing the
extent of secular impairment of religious belief. Such research will serve as
evidence of the necessity for accommodation programs.
The Supreme Court can be sensitive both to the existing burden upon free
exercise and the nature of the free exercise gain obtained from the legislation.
By considering these factors simultaneously, the Court can determine the
degree of free exercise gain derived from accommodation legislation. 41
2. Free Exercise Burdens Created by the Statute
The final free exercise consideration will be the extent to which the leg-
islation accommodating religion also burdens its free exercise. Such a burden
143. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
144. As they may in the case of enactment of a moment of silence statute which facilitates
the free exercise of religion.
145. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part I,
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1389 (1967). See also Pfeffer, The
Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 Gao. L.J. 1115 (1973).
146. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
147. The greater the existing burden on free exercise imposed by a public school program,
which excludes religious belief or promotes secular ideology, the greater the need for religious
accommodation under the first amendment protection of religious free exercise.
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can result from legislation which seeks to accommodate a particular religious
sect while excluding or even inhibiting the development of other sects.
The Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente 48 recently stated that "[t]his
constitutional prohibition of denominational preference is inextricably con-
nected with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause .... Free
Exercise can thus be guaranteed only when legislators-and voters-are
required to accord their own religions the very same treatment given to small,
new or unpopular denominations."'' 49 In Larson the Court applied strict
scrutiny to legislation having a denominational preference' 50 thereby under-
scoring the danger in selective accommodation.'
In public education, the requirement that accommodation be denomina-
tionally neutral absent compelling circumstances (circumstances as appeared
in Wisconsin v. Yoder 52) greatly restricts accommodation options. Because
of the increased diversity of religious belief and worship in our society,
accommodation aimed at particular forms of worship or requiring state
instruction of religion are constitutionally problematical. Forms of accom-
modation which free the student in the development of his or her own
theistic belief are to be preferred.
B. Degree of Establishment
Having considered the free exercise gains and losses arising from legislation
which attempts to accommodate religious practice and belief, the analysis
now turns its focus toward establishment clause values. Accommodation of
religion in the public school context raises at least five areas of consideration
relevant to establishment clause infringement.'53
1. Historical Duration of a Particular Accommodation
The Supreme Court has, in recent cases, placed great emphasis upon the
historical duration of a particular government practice accommodating re-
148. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). The Court invalidated a section of the Minnesota Charitable
Solicitations Act which exempted from registration and reporting requirements those religious
organizations which received over half their contributions from members or affiliates. The
Court found the exemption to be a denominational preference in violation of the first amend-
ment.
149. Id. at 245.
150. Id. at 246-47.
151. Humanistic Education Programs which do not present children with predetermined values
but instead attempt to teach children "how to use its methodology to resolve the moral problems
they will face in their lives," Note, supra note 33, at 1205, may themselves raise establishment
clause concerns through value inculcation.
152. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
153. See Buchanan, Accommodation of Religion in the Public Schools: A Plea for Careful
Balancing of Competing Constitutional Values, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1000, 1032 (1981) (containing
a useful development of accommodation analysis for the public school environment).
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ligion. 54 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly, '5
stated that, "The real object of the [First] Amendment was... to prevent
any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy
the exclusive patronage of the national government.' 31 6 Rather than taking
a mechanical approach which would invalidate legislatioi which confers a
benefit upon religion, "the Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or
official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.' 57
The utility of this inquiry in the public school context is open to dispute.
There were varying degrees of accommodation and even worship in the
public schools prior to Engel v. Vitale"" and Abington School District v.
Schempp 51 in the 1960's with no apparent establishment of a state religion.
Many state moment of silence statutes have been enacted within the past six
years, although presumably as a response to these decisions and an attempt
to accommodate religious belief. The tendency that a legislative attempt to
accommodate religion has to establish a religious faith is an establishment
clause consideration.
2. Message of State Approval of a Particular Religious Sect
To the extent that accommodation legislation approves or assists a par-
ticular religious belief or practice to the exclusion of other beliefs or practices
it becomes constitutionally problematical. As Justice O'Connor concurred
in Lynch,' 60 direct infringement of the establishment clause results from
"government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message.' 16'
Message of state approval of a particular religious sect can arise from the
nature of the government accommodation practice or the manner in which
the practice is implemented. Accommodation practices such as audible prayer
or Bible reading can serve to alienate nontheists (if the government composed
154. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3333 (1983) (Court referred to the Continental
Congress' practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer in upholding Nebraska's legislative
prayer practice).
155. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
156. Id. at 1361 (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 728 (1833)).
157. Id. at 1361.
158. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
159. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
160. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
161. Id. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 61:429
MOMENT OF SILENCE
prayer presupposes a Supreme Being) or non-Christians. The religious mi-
nority's protection from legislation facilitating the majority's religious prac-
tice must remain a central concern of the first amendment.
Accommodation practices which strive to protect the capacity to form
theistic belief in a secular public school are consistent with free exercise
protections. Through cultivating religious diversity (but no religious com-
pulsion) by respecting a student's right to formulate his or her own religious
belief, accommodation can facilitate free exercise without state compulsion.
A practice which, on its face, does not convey a message of approval or
disapproval, may still be implemented in such a manner that it does convey
such a message. Legislators should be sensitive to this abuse and build in
safeguards protecting the religious neutrality of an accommodation prac-
tice. 62
3. Message of State Approval of Religion over Non-Religion
Similar to state approval of a particular religious sect, state approval of
religion over non-religion can also be problematical under the first amend-
ment. State approval of religion can be particularly troublesome as it can
burden the free exercise of belief and result in an establishment clause
violation.
The free exercise clause "at the very least [was] designed to guarantee
freedom of conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion in matters
of belief.' ' 63 Accommodation practices which seek to do more than coun-
teract the secular hostility toward theistic belief are to be treated with
suspicion. Practices which reflect state approval and coerce religious beliefs
extend beyond the first amendment protection of the capacity to form theistic
belief. Furthermore, the establishment clause can be viewed, in part, as
intending to assure that the advancement of a church come from its followers,
not from coercive practices by the state.' 64 Accommodation practices must
be scrutinized to determine if they contain an excessive coercive effect in
conscience or actions.
Many forms of government accommodation of religion in the public
schools will not send a message of state approval of religion. Recognizing
that religious belief is burdened in secular education, practices which seek
162.
By mandating a moment of silence, a State does not necessarily endorse any
activity that might occur during the period .... Nonetheless, it is also possible
that a moment of silence statute, either as drafted or as actually implemented,
could effectively favor the child who prays over the child who does not.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2499 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. L. TIUBE, supra note 4, § 14-6, at 818.
164. Giannella, supra note 21, at 516-18.
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to respect the integrity of individual religious belief merely place theistic
religion on equal footing with secular ideology.
4. Degree of Entanglement Between Religious
and Government Institutions
Institutional entanglement expresses the fear that excessive interaction
between church and state "may interfere with the independence of the
[religious] institutions, give the institutions access to government or govern-
mental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster
the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines. 3 165 Such
entanglement between the religious and governmental spheres of influence
may serve only to corrupt both. 66
This inquiry will also focus on the nature of the accommodation practice.
Those practices which merely seek to accommodate religious belief (or the
formation of religious belief) in a noncoercive, nondenominational manner,
will by their nature result in very little, if any, entanglement between insti-
tutions. Conversely, those practices which seek to involve religious institu-
tions in the accommodation process' 67 will raise entanglement issues, as well
as other establishment clause concerns.
5. Degree of Impairment of the Educational
Mission of the School
Although not an explicit establishment clause issue, it is a relevant con-
sideration to inquire into the degree that an accommodation practice might
impair the educational mission of the public school. 68 The recognition that
public schools have a responsibility to provide a secular education and that
students are a captive audience because of compulsory education require-
ments illustrates the necessity in designing accommodation practices to have
minimal impact on school order. This is further required because excessive
impairment of classroom routine may convey state approval of religious
practice and belief.
The distinction between proper and improper messages is subtle, but one
that must be maintained. Under the accommodation principle, government
may recognize theistic belief and permit practices which facilitate the capacity
to formulate those beliefs. 69 Government may not structure those practices
165. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
167. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (in-school release-time
program for religious studies requires government selection and payment of instructors).
168. See Buchanan, supra note 153, at 1032.
169. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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in ways that burden the secular mission of the schools or excessively approve
theistic belief or practice.
IV. MOMENT OF SILENCE IS A PERMISSIBLE ACCOMMODATION
In Abington School District v. Schempp, 170 the Supreme Court held un-
constitutional the practices of Bible reading and reciting the Lord's Prayer
in public schools. Against this prohibition of prayer in public schools has
emerged strong political sentiment that a constitutional amendment permit-
ting individual and group prayer should be adopted.' 7' Some states have
enacted statutes providing for a moment of silence in public schools as a
means of permitting religious activity outside the constitutional prohibition,172
thereby avoiding the difficulty in amending the Constitution.
Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp, considered the proposed justi-
fication for religious exercises at the beginning of the school day (the secular
goals of increased harmony and discipline in the classroom) and concluded
that the establishment clause "forbid[s] the use of religious means to achieve
secular ends where non-religious means will suffice.'7 He then postulated
that "the observance of a moment of reverent silence at the opening of
class" might achieve the legitimate secular purpose served by Bible reading
or audible prayer "without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any
members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the
spheres of religion and government."' 74 One commentator observed that
"since each student could utilize this moment of silence for any purpose he
saw fit, the activity may not be fairly characterized as solely religious, and
since no student would really know the subject of his classmates' reflections,
no one could in any way be compelled to alter his thoughts."'' 75
Under accommodation analysis, a statute requiring a moment of silence
at the beginning of each class day is constitutional as a religious activity
due to the free exercise gains to students-not a perceived minimal estab-
lishment of religion. These statutes constitute a permissible government ac-
commodation of religion because they facilitate the free exercise protection
against impairment of religious belief and the capacity to form religious
belief. 76 A moment of silence results in free exercise gain in excess of
170. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
171. See, e.g., President's message to the Congress transmitting Proposed Legislation, 18
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 664-66 (May 17, 1982). Proposed Amendment reads, "Nothing in
this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or
other public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States or by any State to
participate in prayer." Id.
172. See Note, supra note 3, at 367.
173. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 280-81.
174. Id. at 281.
175. Choper, supra note 4, at 371.
176. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
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establishment clause infringement and, consequently, the Court should rec-
ognize it as permissible accommodation of religion.
A. Free Exercise Considerations
The benefits to free exercise arising from a moment of silence at the
commencement of the school day can be significant. All children deciding
how to use the moment of silence could discuss with their parents, religious
leaders or authority figures how to best make use of the moment of silence
at the beginning of the school day. This exercise is perhaps the consummate
accommodation of the free exercise of religion because of its inherent respect
for the conscience of each student. 77 Occurring in the public schools, a
moment of silence overcomes the "negative form of religious training ''1 1
by structuring the educational curricula to recognize religious belief. Rather
than excluding religion during the time when children are developing their
intellectual and moral foundation, a moment of silence conveys a message
of state respect for the integrity of children's intellectual and spiritual thoughts
by providing for such thoughts within the school curricula. 79 This message
of state respect can also include respect for the subjective beliefs of children.
To the extent that this is so, a moment of silence can reduce the exclusivity
that secular education places on objective and empirical thought. 80
The extent of free exercise impairment which the moment of silence statute
attempts to mitigate will largely be a factual determination. Under the
accommodation analysis, the right to freely practice religion in the public
schools is not being protected. The accommodation principle seeks to ensure
that public education does not impair the capacity to form theistic belief.
As earlier observed, educators and sociologists must further explore and
define the impact of secular ideology upon students of varying ages. Courts
must be sensitive to this form of free exercise burden and permit accom-
modation legislation which addresses this burden in a minimally intrusive
manner.
Legislatures enacting moment of silence statutes should consider the ex-
isting degree of burden upon free exercise. To provide greater flexibility in
accommodation of religion, legislatures may prefer to draft statutes making
a moment of silence exercise voluntary, to be adopted by local school boards
177. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-6, at 818.
178. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Furthermore, a moment of silence can have
the effect of reducing the hostility toward theistic belief contained in Secular Humanistic ideology
and Humanistic Education programs. To the extent that they are present in school curricula,
they are hostile toward theistic belief and seek to replace theism by prejudicing students'
capacities to form theistic belief. A moment of silence, although not directly introducing theistic
values and beliefs, does question the exclusivity of secular ideology by introducing in the
curricula the freedom to have theistic belief.
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and administrators in the event that they perceive a secular burden upon
free exercise in their school district.' 8'
Perhaps the greatest strength of the moment of silence statutes is the
absence of any burden placed on the free exercise of school children. A
moment of silence may not create government or peer pressure to pray or
entertain religious beliefs. The child does not receive any state message to
use the moment in a required manner because each child is left to his/her
own thoughts and meditation. Furthermore, the opportunity for children to
question the piety of their classmates will not arise.'82
To assure the absence of state compulsion to worship, or to worship in
a particular manner, legislation should focus on difficulties that could arise
in implementing a moment of silence. Some students could find a moment
of silence to compromise their religious or non-religious beliefs-perhaps by
reason of instructor or classmate action. For this reason, perhaps the activity
should be designated voluntary8 3 so as to permit student nonparticipation
with minimal attention. Legislatures should also carefully delineate the teach-
er's role in monitoring a moment of silence. State coercion would be present
if a teacher were to suggest that the time could best be spent praying or
visibly engages in prayer when leading a moment of silence. The aim of the
legislation should be to provide a noncoercive forum that facilitates the
independent, individual exercise of student thought outside the sphere of
secular ideology.
The absence of -religious coercion or compulsion is an aim which legis-
latures should consider in drafting and implementing a statute providing for
a moment of silence, but the existence of a minor level of coercion is not
a valid indictment of a moment of silence. Students may obtain large free
exercise gains from a minor level of state coercion which creates minimal
establishment clause concerns. The accommodation principle recognizes that
the absence of religion in public school has the coercive effect of establishing
non-religion. Because the aim of the first amendment is to protect the
capacity to formulate theistic belief, it may be necessary for accommodation
legislation to have an element of religious coercion in order to have an
accommodation impact on children in the secular environment.
B. Degree of Establishment
Moment of silence statutes must be scrutinized to determine the degree
of establishment clause infringement. Under accommodation analysis, the
181. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.062 (West Supp. 1985) (moment of silence exercise
may be implemented by local school board).
182. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2499 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.601 (Page 1985) (participation is voluntary and
not required if there are religious objections).
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danger of religious establishment can be relatively minor in comparison to
the free exercise gains created by a moment of silence.
As the Court in Lynch posited, the object under the establishment clause
is to prevent any "national ecclesiastical establishment.", 4 Under this inquiry
legislative prayer was found not to tend to do so. 85 Under the limited
historical inquiry possible with moment of silence statutes the significantly
lesser degree of coercive religious effect present in a moment of silence than
in audible prayer would tend to show that moments of silence do not result
in an establishment of religion. Although children may be much more sus-
ceptible to subtle coercion than are legislators, a silent moment does not
coerce religious activity or tend to provide a religious organization with
government sponsorship.
Perhaps the greatest strength of moment of silence legislation is the absence
of a message of state approval of a particular religious sect. A silent moment
avoids the conflict between competing sects arising from audible prayer or
devotional exercises which may coincide with certain religions and conflict
with others. A Christian majority can enact a statute permitting silent prayer
but the effect of the legislation is to protect all students' capacity to form
theistic belief (if they should choose to exercise the moment for that purpose).
Some people may argue that the moment is designed with sufficient du-
ration as to permit silent recitation of the Lord's Prayer and therefore
advantages Christian belief. While such a legislative motive may have existed,
it is the nature of the exercise that students may pray to any God, meditate
on religious ideals or not pray at all. The message the state should convey
is respect for the individual thoughts and beliefs of each student without
inquiry into what they might be. The duration of a moment of silence will
not, by reason of its religiously neutral emphasis, convey a significant mes-
sage of state approval of religion.
The Supreme Court has shown sensitivity to the difficulty in determining
the proper role of religion in the public schools. The free exercise guarantee
of freedom of conscience also seeks to prevent state coercion of religious
belief over non-religious belief. Unfortunately, state required silence about
religion in the public school can have the opposite message. In this regard,
Justice Stewart stated:
For a compulsory state education system so structures a child's life
that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in
schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage.
Viewed in this light, permission of such exercises for those who want
them is necessary if the schools are truly to be neutral in the matter of
religion. And a refusal to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as
184. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1361 (1984).
185. Id.
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the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a
religion of secularism, or at the least, as government support of the
beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted
only in private.'"
A moment of silence addresses this secular hostility toward theistic religion
by conveying a corresponding message that the state is not hostile toward
theistic faith and respects the free exercise right that such belief be a personal
choice.
The establishment clause concern that religious and government institutions
each be kept free of the influence of the other is clearly met by a moment
of silence. A silent moment accommodates the religious beliefs of individuals
(not institutions) by respecting their quiet reflection. It is an open-ended
exercise which does not provide religious institutions the opportunity to
manipulate public schools or to interfere with the freedom of those religious
institutions.
Some people argue that political disruption or divisiveness is a form of
excessive entanglement in violation of the establishment clause. The Court
has never recognized that "political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate
otherwise permissible conduct."' 87 It is difficult to envisage the creation of
political divisiveness by this minimally intrusive exercise other than that
resulting from the litigation itself. The divisiveness inquiry is not concerned
with the litigation context, but expresses the aim that government sponsorship
of religion not create political strife. 88
A moment of silence creates minimal establishment clause infringement,
in large part due to its negligible impairment of the secular function of the
public schools. Furthermore, the exercise can have secular gains of increased
student harmony and discipline. As a quiet period at the beginning of the
school day, it assimilates into the opening exercises of the classroom with
minimal instrusion and permits prayer, religious meditation, thoughts on the
day's activities or any nonobstructive use.
Balancing the free exercise and establishment clause concerns as developed
under the accommodation analysis, moment of silence statutes are a con-
stitutional accommodation of religious beliefs in the public schools. The free
exercise gains arise from the message of respect for theistic belief that the
exercise conveys to students. This gain is achieved in a settifig that may
otherwise impair students' capacity to form religious belief and is achieved
in a manner that minimally impairs.public school curricula.
186. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
187. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
188. Id. at 1367 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
The need exists to develop an accommodation analysis which balances the
competing interests of the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment. As Chief Justice Burger observed:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that
has been said by the Court is this: [t]hat we will not tolerate either
governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is
room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference. 189
The accommodation analysis developed in this Note represents an attempt
to define the "play in the joints" in the context of introducing religion into
the public schools.
The exclusion of religious values and belief from public schools has resulted
in the creation of an environment hostile toward theistic belief. Within this
environment the first amendment may permit (or even require) accommo-
dation of religion in order to protect students' capacities to form religious
belief. State statutes permitting a moment of silence at the beginning of the
school day are a constitutional response to this environment under accom-
modation analysis by reason of their benefit to free religious exercise with
minimal establishment clause infringement.
ANDREW WOODBRIDGE HULL
189. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (emphasis added).
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